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U.S policy . . . was rationalized on the grounds of fighting "communism" 
and Soviet influence in Africa, but the U.S . was clearly more concerned with 
securing its own interests in the region than helping foster a stable, secure, and 
peaceful future for the people of Central Africa. Lying at the center of the 
continent, Zaire could provide the U.S. with access to important resources, 
transportation routes, and political favors . Over the years, U.S. rhetoric changed 
slightly ... but in reality policy continued to focus on promoting narrowly 
defined U.S. economic and strategic interests.1 
Introduction 
Lying at the heart of the African continent, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
formerly known as Zaire, is a vast wonderland of rich mineral and natural resources. Yet despite 
the undisputed economic potential of the country, the Congolese people have suffered through a 
century ofrepression and poverty and today remain among the poorest of the world's poor. The 
exploitation of the DRC, first by Belgium and later by internal and external forces, many backed 
by the United States, has effectively rendered this nation a land of chaos and death. 
1 William D. Hartung and Bridget Moix, Arms Trade Resource Center. Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to 
Africa and the Congo War. http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arrns/reports/congo.htm; Internet; accessed 
February 28, 2003. 
Since 1885, when the United States' government became the first to officially recognize 
King Leopold's claim to the Congo, the United States has continuously undermined the 
democratic attempts and economic prosperity of the Congolese population. Throughout the 
DRC's political history the United States has successfully used covert operations under the guise 
of the United Nations, clandestine CIA maneuvers, and/or the pretense of humanitarian relief to 
control American interests in the Great Lakes Region. Although other western nations have used 
their own means to advance their interests in the Congo, this paper will focus on the US' role in 
the Congo. Through an historical account of events that shaped the DRC and through an 
analysis of the United States ' actions during distinct periods in Congolese political history, this 
paper will show how the US undermined the dreams of the Congolese people for the security of 
its own national interests and how the US has now denied responsibility in the current Congolese 
crisis and deserted the dying nation in its time of greatest need. 
Birth of the Belgian Congo 
Contemporary Congolese repression at the hands of the West began with the creation of 
the Congo Free State under the sovereign rule of King Leopold of Belgium in 1885. Prior to 
European imperialism the central portion of Africa was politically comprised of kingdoms and 
empires loosely controlling smaller tribes. Contact with the Europeans was officially made in 
1482 when Portugal's Diego Cao arrived at the mouth of the Congo River, but it was not until 
the travels of journalist Henry Morton Stanley from 187 4 until 1877 that the Congo became a 
region of serious colonial interest. Though Stanley originally scouted the territory for his native 
Great Britain, the British showed little interest in the Congo Basin, and Belgium's King Leopold 
2 
quickly hired him to claim the vast territory for the Belgian crown. To establish legitimacy for 
his interests, Leopold created the Association Internationale pour le Congo in 1879. The AIC 
seemingly represented a coalition of humanitarian agencies fighting against the Arabic slave 
trade in Africa, but in actuality a consortium of bankers financed the AIC.2 While Stanley 
returned to the Congo to chart the land area and obtain treaties with various tribal leaders, 
European powers continued to claim land in their "scramble for Africa." Culminating in the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the European powers had earlier begun to divide Africa 
according to their imperialistic desires. To avoid fighting between the powers the Berlin 
Conference was arranged to peacefully partition the continent. 
Though a young and relatively minor nation at the end of the Nineteenth Century, it was 
the United States who first recognized King Leopold's right to an African playground. On April 
22, 1884, the American Secretary of State declared the US ' recognition of Leopold ' s claim to the 
Congo. Although not a recipient of any African territory, the United States was also a party to 
the Berlin Conference and engaged in discussion regarding the partitioning of the continent and 
the availability of free trade and transportation in the Congo River Basin. Following the 
conference King Leopold formally recognized the Congo Free State (CFS). 
King Leopold ran the Congo Free State as his personal possession until 1908, when 
international criticism forced him to transfer control to the Belgian Parliament. His 
exceptionally repressive and inhumane treatment of the population in order to attain rubber and 
ivory had caused an outcry among human rights advocates. To fulfill his paramount goal of 
increased capital, "the cruel logic of the revenue imperative left Leopold with no other option 
than to transform his nascent administrative system into an infernal machine designed to extract 
2 Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill, eds. , Zaire: A CountJy Study (Washington, D.C. : Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress, 1994), 13. 
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a maximum output of labour and natural resources from the land."3 Unfortunately for the 
Congolese the system of rule under the Parliament did not substantially improve their situation. 
Though the Belgian legislature was not as brutal in their execution of economic objectives, "the 
irreducible tendency to treat Africans as childlike creatures and a firm commitment to political 
control and compulsion" characterized Belgian Parliamentary paternalism.4 
The Congolese Independence Movement 
The rise of Pan-Africanism, international support of African independence, liberal 
criticism of imperialism and a variety of internal factors among the African nations led to the 
mass decolonization of Africa throughout the 1950's and 1960's. In the Congo the repressive 
Belgian rule that focused on continued economic exploitation of mineral resources had created a 
divided class society amongst the Congolese. While.the vast majority of the population 
remained outside the sphere of economic improvement, a class of petty bourgeoisie rose in the 
Congo consisting of educated Africans and African white-collar workers. Several of these 
evolues had earned the distinction of honorary Europeans when the new status of matriculation 
was introduced in 1952. Despite the superficial recognition of these accomplishments by 
Belgium and the West, it became increasingly clear to the evolues that they were regarded as 
sub-standard beings due to their heritage and skin color. A history of racism, instigated by King 
Leopold and instituted by the Belgian Parliament, had permanently cemented black inferiority in 
the eyes of the Europeans. 5 Eventually the petty bourgeoisie joined the mass movement already 
3 Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Zaire." 
4 Ibid. 
5 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo From Leopold to Kabila: A People 's History (London: Zed 
Books, 2002), 41 . 
4 
taking place amongst the working class and the lumpenproletariat to form the democratic 
opposition that would ultimately bring down Belgian rule. In the Belgian Congo, as elsewhere in 
Africa, the passion of the masses and the education of the evolues created an inescapable force . 
The Congolese independence movement arose in this complex time of decolonization and 
fermented politically in the form of two preeminent political parties. While Joseph Kasa-Vubu 
led the Alliance des Bakongo (Abako ), Patrice Emery Lumumba headed the Mouvement 
National Congolais (MNC). By 1958, a multitude of political parties existed, but these two were 
the primary catalysts of change. While Abako was a regionally supported party, Lumumba's 
MNC can be categorized as the only truly national party with a broad base of support. 6 It was 
Kasa-Vubu who first called for independance immediate, in response to a plan proposed by 
Belgian professor A.A.I Van Bilsen outlining a thirty-year transition period leading to Congo's 
independence.7 It was Lumumba's speech at the All-African People's Conference in Accra, 
Ghana; however, that outlined his basic tenets on independence, the same tenets that would 
characterize the Congolese independence movement for decades to follow. In his talk Lumumba 
stressed the importance of national unity, economic independence, and Pan-African solidarity.8 
Following his return from Accra, Lumumba held a mass rally on December 28, 1958, and called 
for total independence from Belgium. In tum Abako planned their own political rally for 
January 4, 1959. Though thousands of people showed up in Kinshasa for the Abako rally, Kasa-
Vubu was forced to reschedule it due to bureaucratic complications, and he instructed the people 
to reconvene in two weeks. The announcement agitated the already emotional masses, and the 
atmosphere exploded into an anti-Belgian street riot. Crowds threw rocks at police and white 
motorists and destroyed any visible sign of white colonial power, including European shops. 
6 Carlene J. Edie, Politics in Africa: A New Beginning? (n.p. : Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2003), 55. 
7 Meditz and Merrill, 23. 
8 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 84. 
5 
Official Belgian statistics reported nearly fifty deaths and three hundred people injured, though it 
is probable that the actual figures are much higher.9 The fourth of January is now celebrated in 
the Congo as International Martyr' s Day. 
Shocked by the unexpected violence of a presumably controllable populace, Belgium 
quickly restructured its plan for decolonization. Following the riot the Congo became 
increasingly ungovernable, and the people openly dismissed Belgian authority. 
Belgian officials hosted the Round Table Conference in Brussels from January 20 to February 
20, 1960, in order to discuss liberation with representative Congolese party leaders . The Round 
Table succeeded in finalizing the date of June 30, 1960, for complete Congolese independence. 
Although Patrice Lumumba had been jailed prior to the conference for his involvement in a 
deadly riot in Stanleyville, he was released as a preemptive condition of the Round Table. 
During his absence he was represented by his friend and follower Joseph Mobutu. 10 A second 
Round Table Conference was held in April of 1960 dealing with the economic conditions of the 
power transfer. However, only one prominent Congolese politician, Moise Tshombe, showed up 
for the conference, a critical mistake on the part of the leadership that would haunt the country 
for decades. It was at this economic forum that Belgium successfully transferred state portfolios 
of companies to Belgium through privatization while leaving the Congo with virtually all the 
colony' s public debt. 11 
The Belgian-Congolese arrangements for power transfer included national elections in 
May of 1960 to fill the bicameral parliament and executive posts. Lumumba' s MNC won a slim 
majority of seats in both chambers due to an alliance with smaller parties, and therefore Patrice 
9 Maurice N. Hennessy, The Congo: A Brief History and Appraisal (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
Inc., 1961), 73. 
10 Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica Online. s.v. "Mobutu Sese Seko." 
http://search.eb.com/ebiarticle?eu=7553 l ; Internet ; accessed February 5, 2003. 
11 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 88. 
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Lumumba became the Congo's first Prime Minister. Because Kasa-Vubu ' s Abako won 
numerous seats in the Parliament as well, he became the first Congolese president, a largely 
ceremonial position. The first national elections had gone relatively smoothly and on June 30· 
1960, the Democratic Republic of Congo was recognized as a sovereign nation. 
Throughout the first wave of African decolonization the United States was publicly 
supportive of African independence movements and respected the right of self-determination. 
Privately, however, the US had a number of covert interests in the region and had reasonable 
cause to worry about the possible outcomes of decolonization. Although the United States had 
few official ties with Africa in the form of direct land holdings, the US economic and political 
interests in the continent were diverse and substantial. Given the vacuum in economic control 
following the exit of the colonial masters, the US had an immense opportunity to engage the 
newly independent countries. American economic goals coupled with the huge resource 
potential of Central Africa demanded that the US strengthen its foothold in the Congolese 
economy. Already minerals from the Congo had proved immensely important to US security. 
The uranium used in the first atomic bombs came from Congolese mines. 12 The US was well 
aware that natural resources in the Congo included "cobalt, copper, cadmium, petroleum, 
industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium, 
bauxite, iron ore, coal, hydropower, timber"13 and that in 1959 "the Congo produced 9 percent of 
the "Free World's" copper, 49 percent of its cobalt, 69 percent of its industrial diamonds . .. as 
well as a number of specialized metals used in the nuclear and electrical industry." 14 Even 
absent economic interests the Congo was still of immense importance to the US as it was the 
12Ibid., 29. 
13 Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook 2002, s.v. "Congo, Democratic Republic of the." 
http: //www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/cg.htrnJ; Internet; accessed January 28, 2003. 
14 Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1974), 29. 
7 
geopolitical key to central Africa; a giant bordering nine nations and two of the world's five 
largest lakes. Due to the realities of the Cold War, the DRC was automatically thrown into the 
mayhem of the Capitalist vs. Socialist and pro-West vs. pro-Communist international system. 
Political Unrest following Congolese Independence 
Internal strife and external manipulation began to dismantle the Congolese government 
immediately after the Democratic Republic of Congo was declared. On July 5, 1960, only five 
days after independence, chaos erupted when Congolese soldiers in the military, formerly the 
Force Publique, mutinied against their Belgian officers. The Belgian generals had told the 
soldiers that nothing would change in the military following independence and that Belgian 
officers would remain in posts of command. Because Prime Minister Lumumba had previously 
promised the soldiers that military training would be available to allow for eventual promotion of 
the Congolese, the Belgians' announcement led the men to believe that they would be "denied 
the fruits of independence." 15 To appease the mutineers Prime Minister Lumumba appointed a 
native Congolese as the new leader of the military, the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC). At 
this time he also appointed his friend Joseph Mobutu as the military Chief of Staff. Despite 
these efforts the mutiny continued, spreading throughout the country, and the loss of law and 
order led to the panicked flight of Belgian nationals across the river to Brazzaville. 
Days after the mutiny began two other crises exploded in the DRC. The disorder 
resulting from the army mutiny led to the arrival of Belgian soldiers on July 10. The Belgian 
military officially came to intervene on behalf of the Belgian nationals whose lives were 
threatened by the bedlam, but the Congolese government interpreted this as an overt act of 
15 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 98. 
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aggress10n. On July 11, the situation further deteriorated when Moise Tshombe announced the 
secession of Katanga province from the rest of the DRC. This large province covering the entire 
southeastern comer of the country was the main source of mineral exports and was of crucial 
interest to many international parties. On July 12, the fledgling Congolese government asked the 
United Nations to dispatch troops to help the country fight external aggression and to restore its 
territorial integrity. Thus began the "largest, most complex, and most costly operation ever 
carried out by the United Nations" until that point. 16 This request for aid played directly into the 
hands of the US government, which would use the cover of UN action to promote its own 
national interests. 
The same internal and external factors working to undermine stability in the DRC were 
also working to remove Prime Minister Lumumba from his post. One of Lumumba's primary 
goals was to reunify the Congo; and in order to put down the Katanga secession, the ANC had to 
march through South Kasai province, where an ethnic bloodbath, also begun shortly after 
independence, was raging. Lumumba made the grave mistake of telling the ANC to put down 
the South Kasai crisis en route to Katanga. This order tragically led to the mass killings of 
unarmed civilians in the region by ANC soldiers. Under the pretext that Lumumba had 
sponsored these murders, President Kasa-Vubu dismissed the Prime Minister from his post on 
September 5. The Parliament refuted this action as unconstitutional, but neither did it allow for 
Kasa-Vubu to be dismissed by Lumumba. To restore order amongst the two feuding sides 
General Joseph Mobutu staged his first military coup on September 14, 1960, in order to 
"neutralize" the leaders. Lumumba was placed under house arrest while representative 
delegations on behalf ofLumumba and Kasa-Vubu went to the United Nations and allowed for 
16 Robert D. Calkins, introduction to Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action by Ernest W. 
Lefever (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institute, 1965), vii. 
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the UN to decide the fate of the leadership. The UN General Assembly declared Kasa-Vubu as 
the legitimate power, and Lumumba was kept detained in the Congo. In late November he fled 
towards Stanleyville, his central hold of power, but was captured on December 1 and 
imprisoned. The former Prime Minister was later taken to the Katanga province where an 
execution squad assassinated him on January 17, 1961. 
The United States involvement in the events following the DRC's independence began 
under the umbrella of the United Nations' peacekeeping mission. Already the 
West viewed Prime Minister Lumumba negatively because he was an emotional leader whose 
nationalist views threatened western control. Lumumba was a democratically elected leader 
who, instead of being accountable to the West for his power, was accountable to his own people. 
These background conflicts came to a head when Lumumba requested UN troop support. The 
UN created the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC) whose mandate was to facilitate 
the withdrawal of Belgian troops, put down the Katanga secession, and restore law and order in 
the country. 17 However, then Secretary- General Hammarskjold and Lumumba had varying 
interpretations of what the mandate ordered and how to go about the removal of Belgian troops, 
resulting in "but one of the many situations which arose and which turned the United Nations 
itself into a political playground for the internal contestants as well as for those external ones 
who also wished to influence the course of events."18 Because Lumumba felt that the UN was 
not providing the security the country needed, he looked elsewhere for international support. He 
received this support from the Soviet Union. 
When Patrice Lumumba accepted military aid and weapons from the Soviet Union the 
United States' Cold War security interests were immediately threatened. Though Lumumba had 
17 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 113. 
18 Hennessy, 99. 
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declared himself and the DRC to be non-aligned, his overt agreement with the USSR prompted 
the US to order his removal as head of state. Documented by Senator Frank Church in his 1976 
report to the US Senate, President Eisenhower gave the Central Intelligence Agency the go ahead 
to remove Lumumba. CIA Director Allan Dulles gave instructions for a head scientist to create a 
poison made from cobra venom that would kill the Prime Minister. However, this particular 
method was aborted once it became clear that the US could use Congolese opposition to secure 
Lumumba's removal. American Andrew Cordier, temporarily in control of the ONUC mission 
for the UN, "threw the weight and the prestige of the UN behind the western demand that Kasa-
Vubu dismiss Lumumba." As stated above Lumumba was dismissed, and the UN ended his 
tenure with their recognition of the Kasa-Vubu government. 19 
Yet the Lumumba threat continued for the Americans once it was clear that his base of 
support remained strong. The eastern half of the DRC was Lumumba's stronghold, and had his 
escape attempt succeeded he likely would have risen to power on the shoulders of the masses. 
Backed by US support the UN did not intervene or offer protection for Lumumba when he was 
arrested, nor when he was severely beaten on his plane ride to Katanga. Even in prison the 
popular support loyal to Lumumba threatened the US and Belgium. On January 17, 1961, it was 
Belgium who was ultimately directly responsible for the assassination of Lumumba.20 The death 
ofLumumba resulted in the "shock and anger of most developing nations in the face of the cold-
blooded murder of the man who best symbolized the struggle of African nationalism against the 
19 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 108. 
20Ibid., 112. 
11 
forces of neo-colonialism. "21 However, according to the US Department of State, "Prime 
Minister Lumumba died under mysterious circumstances"; there is no mention of assassination.22 
The removal of Lumumba left Washington with a clearer path to economic integration 
but not necessarily an easy one. The first move by the West was to fill the vacant Prime Minister 
position with Cyrille Adoula, a pro-western moderate. Though mass support for Lumumbists 
remained strong, the violent political climate eventually led to the self-imposed exile of many of 
Lumumba's followers. They regrouped across the river in Congo-Brazzaville and continued 
their fight externally through the creation of the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL) political 
party. 
In September 1962 and January 1963, the secession efforts of South Kasai and Katanga 
were ended through the force of UN troops. The leader of the Katangan secession, Moise 
Tshombe, left the Congo following the defeat of his secession and resided in Spain for seventeen 
months until his return to the DRC. Unrest continued to simmer in the country as political and 
social turmoil continued. Parliament was dismissed, senior executive officers were exiled or 
imprisoned, and pro-Lumumbists revolts continued throughout the country. In January 1964, 
opposition forces under Pierre Mulele commenced an all out guerilla war in the eastern part of 
the country; and in April the CNL joined in the fight. The pro-Lumumbists forces combined to 
create the Armee Populaire de Liberation (APL); and on August 4, they captured the Congo's 
second largest city. The CNL created a government and declared the People's Republic of the 
Congo in Stanleyville under President Christophe Gbenye on September 5. 
The resurgence of nationalist, pro-Lumumbist power in the Congo again propelled the 
United States to action. However, this time the removal of United Nations troops in June 1964 
2 1 Meditz and Merrill, 36. 
22United States Department of State. Bureau of African Affaris. "Background Note: Democratic Republic 
of Congo." http: /iwww.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm; Internet; accessed March 5, 2003. 
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forced the United States to act without the umbrella of a UN mandate. To put down the 
insurgence in the east, the "CIA had since early 1964 started to conduct a major paramilitary 
campaign against the Kwilu and eastern insurrections. Since the CNL received support from 
Nasser's Egypt and the Eastern bloc countries, the counter-insurgency was led by the United 
States."23 Efforts culminated in the US led Operation Red Dragon, a counterinsurgency 
orchestrated by the CIA and Belgian paratroopers. American President Lyndon B. Johnson 
ordered the operation in the name ofrescuing white settlers who were being held hostage by a 
rebel group. However, this operation was scheduled to coincide with the arrival of Tshombe's 
Katangan gendarmes. It was due to the assistance of US paratroopers and air support that 
Stanleyville fell and the eastern rebellion was crushed.24 Tshombe had returned in July of 1964 
and had replaced Adoula as Prime Minister. His troops successfully helped the US quell the 
rebellion whereas the ANC had repeatedly failed in this task. 
As shown through Operation Red Dragon, the US was determined to maintain its 
interests in the DRC but knew that endless military operations were not the most efficient, cost 
effective, or politically justifiable route to resource exploitation. The US needed a strong power 
on the inside of the country that could maintain control while remaining friendly to the West. 
The Kleptocracy of Joseph Mobutu 
The US' key to stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo lay in finding a strong, 
centralized power center that was beholden to western backers and not to a popular constituency. 
For the United States, ANC Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu perfectly filled this role. The United 
23Nzongola-Ntalaja, 136. 
24 Meditz and Merrill, 42. 
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States had been supporting Mobutu since the late l 950 ' s when the young man was studying in 
Brussels. Although originally believed to be a follower and friend of Lumumba, Mobutu's 
connections to the West undermined any possibility of loyalty to Lumumba. This became clear 
during Mobutu's first military coup in 1960 and through his acquiescence to the assassination 
plot against the Prime Minister.25 Following Lumumba's death Mobutu became the leader of the 
Binza Group, the moderate coalition of government leaders whose unitarist beliefs outweighed 
those of the moderate federalists in the central government. Mobutu was politically active as 
military Chief of Staff throughout the first half of the 1960' s, but he primarily exercised his 
power behind the scenes. This covert control ended with his second coup d' etat on November 
24, 1964, wherein he began his reign over the country that would end nearly thirty-three years 
later. 
The United States supported the coup of General Mobutu although it effectively replaced 
the Prime Ministership of Moise Tshombe, whom the US had also backed, because Tshombe 
ended up to be more difficult to manipulate than previously thought. President Kasa-Vubu 
dismissed Tshombe from office in 1965, and the US did not step in to secure his post. Tshombe, 
a moderate federalist in opposition to the Binza Group, had accepted a new constitution in 1964 
and had presided over national elections in May of 1965. The elections went relatively well, and 
a parliamentary democracy appeared to be progressing. However, "in spite of this and other 
encouraging signs of political maturity, a parliamentary regime was deemed incapable of 
maintaining peace and protecting Western interests in such a potentially turbulent country."26 
Ironically the US did not secure the interests of President Kasa-Vubu because his dismissal of 




As opposed to Congolese leaders whom the US supported and dismissed according to 
circumstances, American support of Mobutu leading up to the coup had been continuous. In 
May of 1963, Mobutu had visited President Kennedy at the White House and had been praised 
for his efforts to battle communism. Over the years Mobutu had stayed in continuous contact 
with CIA Station Chief Lawrence Devlin, and it was speculation within the administration that 
Mobutu would eventually come to power through a coup. 27 
From 1965 to 1990, the uncontested dictatorship of Joseph Mobutu took on a seemingly 
dual nature. During certain periods of rule the leader appeared to be publicly anti-West. 
Privately, however, Mobutu remained a staunch western ally throughout his reign. The first few 
years of Mobutu' s rule seemed advantageous to all. The Congolese people, "exhausted from the 
unending strife and repeated crises ... enthusiastically welcomed the new regime and the respite 
it promised."28 Mobutu successfully hid his pro-western tendencies from the population and 
appeared to them as a nationalistic leader who was making concentrated efforts to work with 
non-Binza moderates and student movement leaders. This fa<;ade quickly fell, and the General ' s 
tyrannical ways soon became evident. 
The horrors committed by Mobutu and enacted upon the Congolese people are well 
documented and internationally condemned. His reign consisted of a globally recognized 
kleptocracy in which he used the immense natural wealth of the Congo for personal gain. 
Mobutu used the national bank as his personal account and siphoned millions of Congolese 
dollars to foreign banks and offshore accounts. As one scholar notes: 
27 Michael G. Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990 (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1991), 62. 
28 Ibid, 31. 
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Mindful of the attention he received from the West, Mobutu 
took care to be accompanied on his trips abroad by one of the 
managing directors of state mining companies and/or by the 
governor of the central bank. These officials were expected to 
draw on the numerous accounts their organization maintained 
in foreign banks for any cash that the Congolese dictator might 
need for lavish entertainment, expensive gifts for influential 
friends and other forms of political corruption. 29 
This continuous draining of the Congolese' money by the autocrat explains why "while his 
country's per capita income hovered below $200 from 1967 to 1990, Mobutu emerged as one of 
the world's wealthiest leaders, with an estimated fortune of several billions."30 
During Mobutu's tenure international aid going to the country was used for political 
patronage and clientilism and rarely for the social or economic relief of the people. Mobutu used 
his power to "help associates profit from clandestine trade, avoid taxation, and explore new 
rackets in activities that made use of state regulatory power such as passport sales, money 
laundering, and drug trafficking. "31 
External loans were used by Mobutu to finance massive industrial projects that ultimately 
failed to reach projected outputs. The Maluku steel plant, designed to reduce imported steel 
expenditures, operated at 10 percent capacity from its completion in 1975 to its shutdown in 
1980. The massive lnga-Shaba power line, partially financed by the US Export-Import Bank, 
took four years longer than expected to construct and eight years after completion was still 
producing at 14 percent of total capacity. 32 By 1970, the DRC's external debt had reached $5 
billion dollars; a considerable amount for a country well endowed with natural resources.33 With 
29 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 150. 
30 Edie, 80. 
31 Ibid., 82. 
32 Meditz and Merrill, 154-155. 
33 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 149. 
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all of the state's legitimate earnings from mining going to the personal spending habits of the 
state bourgeoisie or to white elephant projects, the Congolese people saw little improvement in 
their daily lives. The DRC experienced a relatively strong economic period in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's due to increased foreign investment and a high world copper demand, but in 
terms of per capita GDP, Zaire remained among the poorest of African countries. The 
breakdown in infrastructure that resulted in the DRC was immense. Given the already poor 
quality of most Congolese schools and health facilities, the virtual abandonment of these 
institutions by the government led to their complete collapse. The standard of living in the 
already destitute nation began to decrease in 1975, culminating in a nation that was economically 
and socially better off during the colonial period. 34 The International Monetary Fund attempted 
to reverse the downward spiral of the economy and introduced seven stabilization plans between 
1976 and 1986. However, "the bottom line was that Mobutu had mortgaged Zaire's future and 
had to contract new loans merely to service the already existing debt."35 
A social representation of Mobutu's dictatorial ways was his unilateral changing of the 
Congo's name to Zaire on October 27, 1971. This policy of "authenticity" also included the 
changing of city and village names, the outlawing of Christian or western names for the people, 
and the banning of western dress such as suits for men and dresses or trousers for women. In 
accordance with these laws the General changed his own name from Joseph Mobutu to Mobutu 
Sese Seko. 
Though the United States and the international community were aware of Mobutu's 
repressive autocratic rule, the US continued its military, economic and political support of his 
34 Ibid ., 151. 
35 Schatzberg, 40. 
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reign. In a report on US arms sales in Africa, the involvement of the American military in Zaire 
is detailed: 
Despite continued reports of widespread corruption and 
human rights abuses in Zaire, the U.S. helped build Mobutu's 
arsenal with a fleet of C -!30 transport aircraft and a steady 
supply of rifles, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, patrol boats, and 
communication equipment. By the time the dictator was ousted 
in 1997, the U.S. had delivered more than $300 million in military 
hardware to Mobutu's regime ... The U.S. also trained 1,350 
of Mobutu's soldiers at a cost of more than $100 million.36 
The US continuously supported Mobutu's Zaire in defense against Soviet aggression in 
Africa and used American International Military Education and Training (IMET) to conduct 
bilateral training sessions with the ANC. The US justified their policy by asserting that loyalty 
in the face of the communist threat was paramount to security. African nations needed to depend 
on the US as a constant, and this would assure that these same nations would remain loyal to the 
US . Reciprocity was key during the bi-polar era. Underlying military expenditures and loyalty; 
however, was also the assumption that American interests would be protected in the economic 
zone. 
Though W estem powers had aided each other when their interests aligned, private 
national interests eventually outweighed loyalty to previous alliances. The United States needed 
to break Belgium's economic control of the Congo. To help the US penetrate the Congolese 
economy, Mobutu took two steps. In 1966, Mobutu passed the Bakajika Law that recognized the 
state's claim on all land and mineral rights in the country. In January 1967, he nationalized 
Belgians giant mining company, Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga (UMHK). This enormous 
economic powerhouse had controlled the majority of Katangan minerals since its inception in 
36 Hartung and Moix. 
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1906. Belgium responded to these measures by placing an embargo on Congolese copper. The 
US mediated between the two countries to resolve the dispute. Though the situation was 
portrayed to the Congolese people as a victory in the face of western economic power, the true 
victory was for the West and the quickly growing Congolese bourgeoisie.37 
Politically the United States kept close ties with Mobutu by constantly referring to Zaire 
as a close friend and ally in the fight against communism. Although American leaders were 
aware of human rights abuses taking place in Zaire, these allegations were overlooked as long as 
Mobutu remained trustworthy. Tensions surfaced; however, when Mobutu's "authenticity" 
directive led to "Zairianization" or privatization of foreign-owned enterprises. As expected the 
US was upset by this unforeseen move. By 1975, however, both sides were in agreement on the 
civil war in Angola and tensions ceased. The Carter Administration, whose foreign policy 
objectives heralded human rights improvements, was not as accepting of Mobutu as his 
predecessors had been. Carter refused to send military aid to help Zaire in the first Shaba War 
(formerly Katanga province) and put pressure on the regime to improve its human rights record. 
Carter relinquished, sent military aid during the second Shaba War, and put pressure on the 
Senate not to cut military aid to the country. With the changing of the guard in the US and the 
eruption of conflict in the Middle East in 1980, American-Congolese relations soon normalized, 
and both the Reagan and Bush administrations heralded Mobutu as a strong ally.38 
37 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 47 . 
38 Meditz and Merrill, 258. 
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Resistance Continues in Mobutu's Zaire 
While political opposition under Mobutu was systematically repressed, pockets of 
resistance occasionally arose to reinforce the notion that dissent can never be completely 
eradicated. Internal opposition under Mobutu's reign had been confined to criticism of specific 
policies, and rarely was the actual legitimacy of the government called into question. External 
opposition, however, remained alive throughout the 1970's and 1980's, finding a source of 
strength in the Front de Liberation Nationale Congolais (FLNC). The FLNC, based in 
neighboring Angola, waged the first and second Shaba Wars, in 1977 and 1978 respectively. 
Both wars failed to secure the objective of economically strangling the regime while allowing the 
masses to revolt and take power. As previously mentioned, following the first Shaba War United 
States President Jimmy Carter pressured Mobutu for political reform. In response to US pressure 
Mobutu allowed Parliamentary elections in 1977 that led to a slight increase in political 
freedoms; nevertheless, Mobutu won the election unopposed. The Group of 13, a coalition of 
anti-Mobutist legislators, formed in 1980 and demanded reforms in the government. The group 
wrote a letter to the president severely criticizing his actions. Though the group was originally 
condemned to death they were subsequently internally exiled, and many were arbitrarily jailed 
multiple times in the following decade.39 
In 1990, two and a half decades of political oppression and economic decline led to the 
first real threat to Mobutu's power. Previously in 1988, a mass rally of the Union pour la 
Democratie et le Proges Social (UDPS), the political party founded by the former Group of 13, 
had symbolized the increasing weakness of the Mobutu's strength. Under intense internal 
pressure Mobutu officially ended the one-party state on April 24, 1990; a move that directly led 
39 Schatzberg, 49. 
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to the creation of multiple political parties and the convening of a national conference in August 
of 1991. Mobutu attempted to quell the rising popular sentiment against him by appointing 
Etienne Tshisekedi, a vocal opponent and popular national hero, to the post of Prime Minister in 
July of 1991. Though many viewed Tshisekedi as Mobutu's largest political threat, Tshisekedi 
initially accepted the post. Immediate pressure from the Congolese masses forced Tshisekedi to 
reverse his decision. 
The pressure to reform the government did not end with the dismissal of the one-party 
system. On August 7,1991, the Conference Nationale Soveraine (CNS) convened in Kinshasa 
with nearly three thousand delegates representing all walks of Congolese life. The mission of the 
CNS was to critically analyze the historic problems of Zaire, draft a new constitution, and outline 
policies for a transitional government that would ensure a democratic future. While the logistics 
of the conference went smoothly, Mobutu remained adamantly opposed to the proceedings 
because of his fear that the CNS would strip him of his power. In July of 1992, the US began 
negotiations outside of the CNS to develop a power-sharing agreement between Mobutu and his 
opposition. The CNS delegates were unaware of these background maneuvers as they continued 
openly debating and voting on policies. The Compromis Politique Global (Comprehensive 
Political Compromise) eventually mediated by the US was introduced to the CNS in August of 
1992 as afait accompli, and delegates were instructed to incorporate it into the CNS charter.40 
The compromise provide for a two-year transition period under a government that was 
accountable to a provisional parliament, both elected by the CNS. Mobutu would remain in 
power during the transitional period as the ceremonial president of Zaire. The CNS, forced to 
adopt this resolution, held the parliamentary and government elections on August 14 and 15, 
40 Nzongola-Ntalaja, 193 . 
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1992. Etienne Tshisekedi was elected Prime Minister, and this time the masses accepted his 
position enthusiastically. 
The successes of the national conference and the multi-party elections were quickly 
crushed on December 1, 1992, when Mobutu led his third coup d'etat. He closed the CNS five 
days later and removed Tshisekedi from his post in December of 1993. While the US offered 
tough talk in international circles they did not move to intervene on behalf of the democratically 
elected prime minister. The US' solution was to return to the drawing board and attempt another 
slow set of negotiations. 
Negotiations between the two sides resulted in an immensely confusing political 
atmosphere wherein both Mobutu's and Tshisekedi ' s government were running within the 
country. In 1994, this dual authority ended when Mobutu combined his former parliament and 
the CNS elected parliament into one national assembly of over seven hundred members, the 
HCR-PT. One fundamental law was promulgated in April of 1994, and Leon Kengo was sworn 
in as Prime Minister on July 6. Kengo had been Prime Minister under Mobutu's original one 
party state, and his first reign had ended in 1990. The US supported Kengo because he was 
believed to be an efficient technocrat with a strong hand in economics. Though Kengo' s new 
government was superficially established as a transitional government, the parliament was 
composed of Mobutu's cronies, the independent electoral commission was sabotaged by Kengo, 
and the elections to be held in July of 1995 were postponed for two more years. 41 As the months 
of "transition" passed it became clear that Mobutu had no intention of giving up power and that 
drastic measures were needed to prevent another thirty-year reign. A guerilla army under 
Laurent Kabila responded to this challenge and unequivocally forced Mobutu into exile on May 
16, 1997. 
4 1 Ibid ., 206. 
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From the inception of multi-party politics in Zaire until the day of Mobutu ' s exile, it was 
clear that his power was in decline. In addition to internal resistance battling his clearly 
illegitimate regime, international allies had begun to minimize their support for him. Following 
the end of the Cold War and the victory of democracy over communism, protecting Africa from 
the Soviet Union was no longer of paramount importance to the United States. Serious problems 
in the Middle East and Asia switched the focus of US attention away from the Congo. Although 
economic interests were still important to the US, it was becoming more difficult to explain 
American support of Mobutu in the face of overwhelming evidence of human rights violations. 
Although the US government delivered more than $4.5 million to Mobutu in 1991 in military 
hardware, later that year Congress suspended all direct economic assistance to the Congo.42 The 
US officially recognized Tshisekedi's government in 1992 and encouraged Mobutu to endorse 
the democratic transition. Once again, however, the US did nothing to prevent or destabilize his 
third coup. The US still believed in the importance of a strong Zairian leader. Eventually US' 
declining support for Mobutu in that particular role culminated with the US' failure to assist 
Mobutu in the face of Kabila's imminent threat and its immediate recognition of Kabila's 
government. 
Renewed Crisis in the Congo 
The forced exile of Mobutu Sese Seko and the subsequent end to his autocratic rule did 
not succeed in pacifying Congolese strife. Beginning shortly after Laurent Kabila's takeover and 
continuing to the present, a new conflict is ripping through the heart of Africa. While the 
political and tribal issues underlying this war can be traced back to the colonial period, the first 
42 Hartung and Moix. 
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major event directly relating to the war occurred in 1994. In 1994, in neighboring Rwanda, 
ongoing political and military tension between the ethnic Hutu's and Tutsi's resulted in the mass 
genocide of over five hundred thousand Tutsi soldiers and civilians by the Hutu controlled 
Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR).43 When the Tutsi government regained effective control, 
millions of Hutu's fled into the Congo, including the FAR soldiers and Hutu extremists referred 
to as Interhamwe. Regrouping on the Rwandan-Zairian border, FAR and Interhamwe conducted 
raids into Rwanda, many of which were perpetrated on unarmed civilians. The Tutsi-led 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RP A) launched its own raids into Zaire in October 1996 that coincided 
with a growing internal Congolese turmoil. 
Internal dissent in Zaire was strong in the mid-1990's and particularly strong in the east, 
where Lumumbist sentiment had survived and where many rebel groups had successfully hidden 
from Mobutu. The particular crisis in the east began in 1981 when the Zairian parliament striped 
Zairian Tutsi's, collectively known as Banyamulenge, of their Zairian citizenship. In April of 
1995, the transitional parliament moved to deny all refugees citizen status, thereby permanently 
excluding the Banyamulenge. Violence commenced between the Zairian army and local tribes 
and exploded in September of 1996.44 By October of 1996, a coalition group of anti-Mobutists 
had formed under the banner of Alliances des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du 
Congo (AFDL). Although this was not a particularly strong military force, backing from the 
Rwandan military and Congolese Tutsi's trained in Rwanda provided the strength behind the 
front. The ADFL under Laurent Desire Kabila and backed by the Rwandan and Ugandan 
militaries successfully marched across Zaire from late 1996 to May of 1997. This force was 
43 Human Rights Watch. "Context: Background to the Conflict," The War Within the War: Sexual 
Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo (Human Rights Watch, 2002) 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602-03 .htm; Internet; accessed January 11 , 2003 . 
44 George Wright, "Mobutu was Chaos," Zmagazine, June 1997, 
http:i/www.zmal!.org/zmag/artic1es/june97\\-Tight.htm; Internet; accessed February 5, 2003 . 
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virtually unchallenged by Mobutu's army, which consisted of poorly paid and inadequately kept 
soldiers with no will to serve a dying regime. When Kabila's forces reached Kinshasa Mobutu 
fled into exile. He died of prostate cancer only three months later in Morocco, abandoned by 
western support. 
The Congolese masses embraced the figure of Laurent Kabila, who in the eyes of many 
had delivered them from the decades ofrepression and poverty. One of Kabila' s first political 
moves was to reinstate the nation's former title of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At 
Kabila's first mass rally after declaring himself President, he promised to hold presidential and 
legislative elections in April of 1999. However, Kabila' s popularity was short-lived. The ADFL 
banned all political parties before the end of the year, arrested opposition activists on multiple 
occasions, and failed to curb human rights abuses perpetrated by its soldiers.45 The hero that had 
replaced the enemy was quickly turning into the Congolese' reoccurring nightmare. 
The relative military stability that ended 1997 could not sustain itself in the following 
year. Stark differences between Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan backers led to a political 
and military split in late July. While Rwanda and Uganda expected to establish economic 
spheres and buffer zones in the eastern portion of the Congo, Kabila felt that the time had come 
to rule the nation independent of foreign troops. Kabila moved to dismantle Rwandan control 
from the military, and on July 27 he demanded the removal of all foreign troops from the 
country. The cleavage that resulted prompted Rwanda and Uganda to support a new rebel group 
in eastern Congo, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD). More troops 
arrived from Rwanda and Uganda, and several forces flew to Bas-Congo with the intention of 
capturing Kinshasa and ousting Kabila. However, Kabila enlisted troops and military support 
45 Encycopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica Online. s.v. "Kabila, Laurent." 
http://search .eb.com/eb/print?eu=368 l 00; Internet; accessed February 5, 2003. 
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from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia and successfully defended Kinshasa. The Rwandans and 
the RCD retreated to the east where they successfully captured a large portion of the country. 
Chad also gave initial support to Kabila but pulled out within the year. The situation was further 
complicated in 1999 when economic disputes between Uganda and Rwanda resulted in battles 
between the two allies and subsequently the split of the RCD into the RCD-Goma, backed by 
Rwanda, and the RCD-Mouvement de Liberation, backed by Uganda. On July 10, 1999, parties 
from the rebel groups, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, and the Congolese government 
signed the Lusaka Peace Accord which called for an immediate ceasefire and the commencement 
of an inter-Congolese dialogue between the Congolese government, the rebel groups, unarmed 
political opposition and civil society organizations. 
Unfortunately parties to the Lusaka Accord did not uphold the ceasefire agreement. By 
2000, a prolonged stalemate had been established that pitted Congolese Tutsi rebels, backed by 
Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, against Congolese and refugee Hutu, and the Congolese army, 
backed by troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia. Added to the numerous forces were 
locally based groups known as Mai-Mai who were initially engaged in battle to protect their 
native lands and villages. However, the "Mai-Mai had "no central command or uniform 
regulations. Some cooperate loosely with others but ... sometimes even engage in combat with 
other Mai-Mai."46 Amongst the various groups fighting has severely affected the North and 
South Kivu provinces that border Uganda and Rwanda. Quite literally the war had become a 
melting pot of accusations, ethnic hostilities, personal revenge, and greed that by January of 
2001 had resulted in the loss of over two million lives.47 
46 Human Rights Watch, "Context: Background to the Conflict." 
47 Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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The assassination of Laurent Kabila and the transfer of power to his son Joseph 
dramatically altered the internal political situation in the DRC. Laurent Kabila was murdered on 
January 16, 2001 , and Joseph immediately took control. Joseph reversed many of his father's 
negative policies. Since his rule began he has allowed legally registered political parties to 
operate relatively freely, has created a legislative assembly to draft a new constitution, has held 
several rounds of talks with rebel groups and civic society organizations, and has allowed UN 
deployment to previously restricted areas of the country.48 However, Joseph Kabila still 
exercises complete executive, legislative and judicial authority; and human rights abuses 
continue to plague both government officials and the Congolese military. While political activity 
has been liberalized, journalists and opposition members are frequently arrested for their views.49 
Within the last year some positive actions have commenced that could aid in securing 
lasting peace in the DRC. In February of 2002, an inter-Congolese dialogue was held and 
several parties reached a tenuous cease-fire and power-sharing agreement. Angola and 
Zimbabwe withdrew the overwhelming majority of their troops from the Congo, as did Uganda 
and Burundi. Rwanda withdrew many of its troops but refuses to completely vacate. 
Unfortunately five years of war fought in the bush by guerilla combatants and organized by rebel 
factions cannot be easily concluded. Battles and daily massacres continue in eastern Congo and 
at the time of writing the political and military situation remains fluid. 
48 United States Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 
"Congo Democratic Republic of the." Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices - 2002. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/1mpt/2002/ l81 77pf.htm; Internet; accessed April 2, 2003. 
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A Humanitarian Emergency in the Congo 
Due to five years of armed conflict, the refugee situation in eastern Congo and the 
surrounding Great Lakes region is undeniably among the worst in the world. Given the already 
destitute conditions of the country's infrastructure due to Mobutu's thirty-year kleptocracy, the 
war has completely destroyed any remaining education and health facilities. Oxfam, a human 
rights organization out of Britain, has recorded the following statistics: 
More than two million people are internally displaced . .. more than one 
million of the displaced have received absolutely no outside assistance 
At least 3 7 percent of the population have no access to any kind of formal 
health care 
2.5 million people in Kinshasa live on less than US $1 per day. In some parts 
of eastern DRC, people are living on US $0.18 per day 
Only 45 percent of people have access to safe drinking water 
Up to 2.5 million people in the DRC have died since the outbreak of the war, 
many from preventable disease 50 
As mentioned above, diseases that had been previously controlled by medical care have 
caused many of the deaths in the DRC. Families are continuously forced to live in the bush due 
to fear of attacks on villages or private homes. The traditionally poor farming sector of society 
has been decimated because families do not remain in one place long enough to grow crops. 
Both the rebel groups and the government recruit boys under the age of twelve as soldiers. Truly 
the situation is a daily hell for millions of Congolese. 
In the DRC, as in many war-tom nations, women and children have suffered 
disproportionately from the brutal aspects of battle. Congolese women have traditionally been 
50 Oxfam. No End in Sight: The Human Tragedy of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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treated as second-class citizens according to the Congolese Family Code but are now barely 
treated as humans. Human Rights Watch released a comprehensive report on the situation in the 
Great Lakes that documented the horrors and human rights abuses suffered daily in the region. 
The report points out that parties on all sides of the conflict are carrying out a war of sexual 
violence against civilian women and children. Specifically sexual violence is used as a weapon 
of war and "soldiers and combatants raped and otherwise abused women and girls as part of their 
effort to win and maintain control over civilians and the territory they inhabited. They attacked 
women and girls as representative of their communities, intending their injury and humiliation to 
terrorize."51 The unchecked occurrences of rape have also led to an outbreak of AIDS; the 
complete extent of which will only be known in years to come. Approximately 60 percent of 
rebel soldiers are carrying the HIV virus and are spreading it rapidly to the civilian population.52 
The refugee situation is further exasperated because virtually all crimes in the war areas 
go unpunished, and many are unreported. The current situation is one oflawlessness where 
impunity for crimes is the norm. Violence has no negative repercussions on the perpetrator and 
now civilians not involved in the war have begun pillaging and raping simply because they know 
their actions will go unpunished. 
Given the immense scale of tragedy and suffering the current crisis in the Congo has 
caused, it is shameful to see the how weakly the international community has reacted to the war. 
The lack of American commitment to the DRC is particularly heinous given the hand the US had 
51 Human Rights Watch. "Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War." The War Within the 
War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo. 
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in the deprivation of the Congolese in the thirty years following independence and the hand it 
played in arming the major parties to the existing war. 
To begin the United States now places restrictive conditions on the availability of aid to 
the DRC. Following the ascension of Laurent Kabila to power, Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright announced that international support and aid relied on Kabila's willingness to establish 
a democracy.53 After two months ofrelative stability in the Congo, Albright announced a US 
pledge of $10 million dollars to be meted out through a World Bank trust fund. Her speech to 
the Organization of African Unity promised US support for those African nations willing to 
undertake economic reforms to strengthen their industries and markets. In 2002, the US 
Department of State introduced the policy of sovereign credit ratings that will help African 
nations "signal to the international community their readiness to participate in the global 
economy by opening their books to public scrutiny."54 Washington's check writing ability turns 
on whether or not the Congo will open its doors to imported western values. 
Additionally the validity of American political intervention in the Congo has been 
severely questioned. Given the unwavering US support of Mobutu and the close military 
relations between the US and Rwanda and Uganda, many Congolese believe the US was or is 
backing the rebels. 55 The United States has frequently supported Rwanda and Uganda in 
exchange for helping the US battle the Islamic threat from Sudan, 56 and the US has been globally 
criticized for their unconditional support of the Rwandan and Ugandan presidents in the face of 
blatant rights abuses. The US did make minor attempts to reconcile the three countries after the 
53 Steven Lee Myers, "Changeover in Africa: In Washington; U.S. Accepts Kabila, but Cautions on 
Democracy." New York Times, May 20, 1997. 
54 United States Department of State. Bureau of African Affairs. "Sovereign Credit Ratings for Sub-
Saharan Africa." http:/iwww.state.govipiaf/scr/; Internet; accessed April 5, 2003 . 
55 Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch World Report 1998: Democratic 
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war initially broke out. The US sent Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice 
on numerous trips around the continent to help mediate the crisis, but the US was simultaneously 
continuing to transfer arms to the countries involved. The US lost credibility to play the 
peacemaker role and eventually stopped trying. 57 
The Bush administration came to power in the US just as the assassination of Laurent 
Kabila caused Joseph to take the controls. American President Bush also called for an end to the 
war and put heavier pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to comply with Lusaka, but there was no 
significant shift of US policy in the region. Although American aid tripled to $80 million in 
2001, the events of September 11 in the United States immediately overshadowed difficulties in 
Africa.58 The Bush administration has followed a narrowly focused policy since September 11 
that has not included room for the Congolese crisis. 
Not only has the United States offered inadequate political and monetary support to end 
the crisis in the Congo, it is also responsible for supplying many of the warring sides with the 
weapons used in battle. The military contributions of the US government to Mobutu ' s regime 
have been previously discussed; however, it is important to note that many of the weapons given 
to the Congolese military at that time have since been transferred to other parties. Corruption 
within Mobutu's army led many officers and soldiers to sell weapons for a profit, regardless of 
the recipient. Despite knowledge that illegal arms sales were taking place in the DRC, 
immediately after Kabila came to power, the US State Department called for a resumption of 
IMET training. The war broke out in 1998 before any action was commenced. 
It is demonstrably not merely the sales of arms to the Congo that have fueled the current 
battles. In 1998: 
57 Hartung and Moix. 
58 Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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U.S. weapons to Africa totaled $12.5 million including 
substantial deliveries to Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe ... 
Uganda received nearly $1.5 million in weaponry over the 
past two years, and Rwanda was importing U.S . weapons 
as late as 1993. U.S. military transfers .. and IMET training 
to the states directly involved has totaled more than 
$125 million since the end of the Cold War. All told, 
the U.S . has helped build the arsenals of eight of the nine 
governrnents directly involved in the Congo war. 59 
While weapons do not in themselves create political havoc in the Congo, the availability and 
quality of weapons can determine the severity and longevity of the violence. So long as the US 
continues arms sales in the region, rebel factions will find the means to continue the war. 
From 1997 to the present the US governrnent's role in the Congo has significantly 
changed from that of an external backer to that of one whose money and support have almost 
completely disappeared. Private interests undoubtedly remain concerned about the economic 
viability of the country, but negligible efforts have been taken to actually end the fighting. Stuck 
in the shadows of September 11 and "falling outside of the media spotlight .. . the population of 
the DRC has been largely abandoned to struggle for their own survival."60 
Conclusion 
The same truth holds for the Democratic Republic of Congo as for any nation on Earth -
political, economic, and military struggles are undeniably a consequence of a variety of factors. 
No single cause can pinpoint where or when something goes irretrievably wrong. Poor decisions 
on the part of the DRC's leaders have taken a major toll on the country, beginning with the 
59 Hartung and Moix. 
60 Oxfam. A Forgotten War - A Forgotten Emergency: The Democratic Republic of Congo. 
http:i/www.osfam.org.Ltkipo licy/papers/drc/drc .htm; Internet; accessed February 23, 2003. 
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overly rushed independence drive from Belgium and continuing to current impunity for human 
rights abuses. By no means have the political leaders of the Congo risen above the 
neocolonialist presumption of corruption and cronyism and allowed their people the "fruits of 
independence." 
On the several occasions where Congolese leaders have answered the call of the people; 
however, international forces, many led by the United States, came into play to subvert their 
attempts. Although an assortment of nations have played a large role in creating the Central 
African crisis, the United States is undeniably a guilty party in the creation of a poverty-stricken 
Congo. The American recognition of King Leopold ' s right to a private African playground, the 
CIA backed plot to assassinate a democratically elected leader, military support of a corrupt and 
merciless despot, and now deprivation of proportional humanitarian and political aid have all 
shaped and continue to shape the daily lives of the Congolese. The United States has 
continuously maintained a relationship with the Congo that while ensuring economic access for 
the US, has condemned the Congolese people to lives of abject poverty and daily hopelessness. 
The US continues to encourage peace and development in the DRC but has refused to actively 
participate in ensuring these aspirations. 
Despite its demonstrable goal in planting the seeds of this 
conflict, the U.S. has done little to acknowledge its complicity 
or help create a viable resolution. Official tours of the region and impressive 
rhetoric will not be enough to contribute to lasting 
peace, democratic stability, and economic development in Africa. 61 
6 1 Hartung and Moix. 
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